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Abstract. *This article explores the evolving legal status of Artificial Intelligence (AI) within the framework of civil law. As AI systems transition from mere tools to autonomous entities capable of generating creative works and making independent decisions, traditional legal doctrines face significant challenges. The research focuses on whether AI should be classified as a subject, an object, or a unique "third category" of legal relations. Key issues discussed include the ownership of AI-generated intellectual property, civil liability for damages caused by autonomous systems, and the limitations of current legislative frameworks in addressing these technological advancements. By analyzing international legal trends and theoretical approaches, the author proposes pathways for integrating AI into the civil law system to ensure legal certainty and the protection of private rights.*

Keywords: *Artificial Intelligence, Civil Law Object, Legal Personality, Autonomous Systems, Civil Liability, Intellectual Property, Digital Rights, Robot Law, Legal Regulation, Smart Contracts.*

Introduction

The rapid integration of **Artificial Intelligence (AI)** into various spheres of human life-ranging from healthcare and finance to creative arts-has triggered a profound shift in the traditional landscape of jurisprudence. In the realm of civil law, AI presents a unique paradox: while it functions as a sophisticated technological tool, its increasing autonomy and ability to generate original outputs challenge the classical definition of a "legal object." Traditionally, civil law objects are passive entities controlled by human will; however, AI's capacity for self-learning and independent decision-making blurs the boundaries between a mere instrument and a decision-making entity.



The relevance of this study stems from the legal vacuum that exists regarding the accountability and ownership associated with AI systems. Currently, most legal systems categorize AI as property or a "tool of the trade." Yet, this classification often proves insufficient when addressing complex issues such as AI-driven torts (damages) or the copyright of works produced without direct human intervention. As AI continues to evolve from "narrow AI" to more general and autonomous forms, the question arises: can current civil law frameworks sufficiently govern an entity that mimics human cognitive functions?

This article aims to analyze the theoretical and practical problems of defining **AI as an object of civil law**. It examines the tension between existing legislative norms and the technological reality of the 21st century. By exploring different legal doctrines-such as the theory of "electronic personhood" versus the "strict object" approach-the research seeks to identify the most effective legal mechanisms for regulating AI, ensuring that innovation is fostered while the rights and safety of civil society are protected.

Main Part

The legal nature of Artificial Intelligence as an object of civil rights is characterized by its dualistic essence: it is both a product of human engineering and an autonomous decision-making agent. To fully understand the problems associated with AI in civil law, it is necessary to examine three fundamental pillars: its legal classification, the challenges of liability, and its role in the intellectual property system. In classical civil law, the distinction between a "subject" (a person with rights and duties) and an "object" (property controlled by a subject) is absolute. AI, however, challenges this dichotomy. Currently, AI is predominantly classified as an intangible object-specifically, a complex piece of software. Yet, as AI systems move from "Weak AI" (task-specific) to "General AI" (autonomous), they begin to exhibit behaviors traditionally reserved for legal subjects, such as entering into smart contracts or managing assets.

The primary problem arises when AI acts beyond the specific instructions of its owner. If an object can modify its own behavior through machine learning,



treating it as a static piece of property becomes legally insufficient. This has led to the emergence of the "Electronic Personhood" theory, which suggests that high-level AI systems should be granted a limited legal status, similar to corporate entities, allowing them to be held accountable in civil transactions. Civil liability traditionally rests on the principle of fault or negligence. However, the autonomous nature of AI creates what legal scholars call the "Black Box" problem—a situation where the internal logic of an AI's decision is opaque to humans.

When an AI system, such as an autonomous surgical robot or a self-driving vehicle, causes damage, identifying the liable party becomes problematic. Under current civil law, if a human cannot foresee or control the AI's specific harmful action, proving negligence is nearly impossible. To address this, there is a global shift toward "Strict Liability" for AI owners and manufacturers. This approach treats AI as a "source of increased danger," ensuring that the victim is compensated regardless of whether a human error can be proven. This transition from fault-based to risk-based liability is a fundamental shift in the civil law treatment of technological objects. The third major problem concerns the products of AI activity. Civil law has historically protected intellectual property as a reflection of human personality and creativity. With the advent of generative AI, we now face a "legal vacuum" regarding the ownership of AI-generated works.

If AI is strictly an object, it cannot own the copyright to the music, art, or code it produces. However, if a human user provides only a minimal prompt, granting that human full copyright contradicts the principle of "originality." On the other hand, if these works are placed in the public domain, it may disincentivize investment in AI technologies. The challenge for civil law is to determine a new category of "derivative digital objects," where the law recognizes the rights of the AI's developer or user while acknowledging the automated nature of the creation.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the legal transformation of Artificial Intelligence from a simple tool into a complex autonomous system necessitates a fundamental re-evaluation of its status as an object of civil law. The research demonstrates that the traditional



classification of AI strictly as a passive object or a piece of movable property is increasingly failing to address the challenges of the digital age, as AI's ability to act independently of its owner's immediate will defies the classical definition of a "thing." To resolve the existing legal vacuum, civil legislation must move toward a more dynamic understanding of digital objects, recognizing that the self-learning nature of AI requires a specialized legal regime. This involves shifting from fault-based to risk-based liability models where the human owner or operator remains the ultimate point of accountability for the autonomous actions of the system. Ultimately, refining the status of AI within the civil code is essential to bridge the gap between static legal norms and fluid technological progress, ensuring a fair balance between fostering innovation and protecting the fundamental rights of all participants in civil society.

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