



## THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ORGANIZATIONS IN TIMES OF CRISIS ( IMF, WORLD BANK, ETC)

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**Abstract:** *This study examines the role of international financial organizations (IFOs), particularly the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, in shaping economic growth in Central Asian transition economies. Using panel data for Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan over the period 2000–2023, the research evaluates how external financial assistance and macroeconomic conditions influence GDP growth. A fixed effects panel regression model with robust standard errors is employed, supported by descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, and Im–Pesaran–Shin panel unit root tests to ensure data stationarity.*

*The empirical results indicate that macroeconomic stability is more decisive for growth than external financial inflows alone. Inflation and fiscal deficit exert a negative effect on GDP growth, underscoring the importance of sound monetary and fiscal policies. Although IMF assistance and World Bank lending display positive coefficients, their effects are not statistically significant, suggesting that international financial support does not automatically translate into higher growth. The findings imply that the effectiveness of IFO programs depends critically on domestic policy discipline and institutional capacity.*

*Overall, the study highlights that cooperation with international financial organizations should be viewed as complementary to internal reforms rather than a substitute for them. Strengthening governance, improving fiscal management, and maintaining price stability are essential for transforming external assistance into sustainable economic gains in Central Asian economies.*

Introduction



Financial crises have become recurring features of the modern global economy, repeatedly testing the stability of markets and institutions. In the last three decades, the world has witnessed several major downturns — the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the 2008 Global Recession, the 2014 oil price collapse, and the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic — each of which reshaped international finance and global development priorities. According to the IMF World Economic Outlook (2024), global GDP fell by  $-3.1\%$  in 2020, marking the sharpest contraction since the Great Depression. The World Bank Global Economic Prospects (2023) reported that global trade volumes declined by  $8.9\%$ , while foreign direct investment fell by  $42\%$  in 2020 (UNCTAD, 2021). The shock pushed over 120 million people into extreme poverty, reversing decades of progress (World Bank 2023).. During these crises, international financial organizations— particularly the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group — emerged as the main multilateral institutions providing liquidity, debt relief, and policy guidance. For example, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the IMF distributed \$650 billion in Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) in 2021 to strengthen global reserves, while the World Bank deployed \$160 billion in support for 100 countries between 2020 and 2023. These coordinated interventions demonstrate that global financial stability heavily depends on the responsiveness of international organizations. (World Bank 2023).

While advanced economies often recover more rapidly due to robust fiscal buffers and developed financial markets, developing countries face prolonged economic and social challenges after crises. According to World Development Indicators (WDI, 2024), the average external debt of developing economies increased from  $45\%$  of GDP in 2019 to  $61\%$  in 2023, while inflation rates in 35 emerging markets exceeded  $10\%$ . The IMF estimates that  $70\%$  of low-income countries are now at high risk of debt distress, with total external debt service reaching \$200 billion annually. At the same time, official development assistance (ODA) declined by  $6\%$  globally (OECD, 2023), creating a larger funding gap for countries in need. In sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, nearly half of all nations depend on IMF emergency financing for macroeconomic stability. Similarly, several



Latin American countries — such as Argentina, Ecuador, and Peru — rely on structural adjustment programs to control inflation, stabilize exchange rates, and attract foreign investment. However, these conditional loans often include austerity measures, which, as Stiglitz (2019) argues, may lead to reduced social spending, unemployment, and inequality. Thus, developing economies are caught between the urgent need for financial aid and the long-term risk of dependency.

The situation in Central Asia presents a vivid example of how IFOs influence regional economic resilience. The region, comprising Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, is highly sensitive to external shocks due to limited export diversification, dependence on remittances, and volatility in commodity prices. WDI (2024) data show that Central Asia's average GDP growth rate declined from 5.2% in 2019 to 1.8% in 2020, then gradually recovered to 4.6% in 2022 after receiving multilateral assistance. (World Bank 2023) The World Bank, IMF, and Asian Development Bank (ADB) jointly provided over \$3.4 billion to support Central Asian economies during the pandemic, primarily aimed at healthcare, business continuity, and fiscal reform (World Bank, 2023). In Uzbekistan, macroeconomic stability was largely preserved despite external pressures. The World Bank Uzbekistan Economic Update (2023) reported that GDP growth decreased from 5.6% in 2019 to 1.9% in 2020, before rebounding to 5.5% in 2022. Inflation averaged 11% in 2022, while external debt reached \$42 billion, equivalent to 36% of GDP. (WDI 2024)The country benefited from IMF technical consultations and World Bank Development Policy Loans aimed at improving public sector transparency, banking reform, and energy transition. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan received a \$1 billion emergency loan from the ADB and World Bank combined to stabilize employment and healthcare expenditures. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan obtained concessional financing from the IMF's Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) to offset fiscal deficits. These cases reflect that IFOs play not only a financial but also a policy-coordinating role in guiding post-crisis recovery across Central Asia.

This research aims to analyze the role and effectiveness of international financial organizations in managing economic crises, focusing on both



macroeconomic outcomes and policy implications. Specifically, the study seeks to assess the impact of IMF and World Bank interventions on GDP recovery, inflation, and debt sustainability in developing and transition economies; (2) examine how conditionality and lending structures affect long-term economic resilience; and (3) explore the regional dynamics of IFO involvement in Central Asia, emphasizing Uzbekistan's experience as a reform-oriented developing state. The novelty of this study lies in its regional, data-driven approach to understanding international crisis management. (Gupta, Tressel, 2020) While numerous global studies analyze IMF and World Bank policies, few have focused empirically on Central Asia's post-crisis performance. This research utilizes a multi-country dataset (2000–2024) from WDI, IMF country databases, and World Bank Annual Reports, employing descriptive and comparative statistical analysis. By correlating financial inflows, GDP growth rates, and debt indicators, the study provides an evidence-based evaluation of IFO effectiveness in promoting stability and sustainable recovery.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature on international financial institutions, highlighting theoretical frameworks and empirical findings related to their crisis management roles. Section 3 outlines the research methodology, including data collection, variables, and analytical techniques used. Section 4 presents the results derived from WDI and IMF statistics, while Section 5 discusses these findings in relation to previous research. Finally, Section 6 concludes with policy recommendations, emphasizing the need for more transparent, flexible, and equitable financial support mechanisms for developing economies.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

The study of international financial organizations (IFOs) and their role during periods of economic crisis has evolved significantly over the past several decades. Numerous scholars have analyzed how institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) contribute to stabilizing economies, reducing volatility, and supporting long-term recovery. According to Bordo and James (2000), IFOs were created to ensure



global financial stability by providing emergency liquidity and fostering cooperation among nations. The IMF was established in 1944 to maintain exchange rate stability and prevent competitive devaluations, while the World Bank initially focused on post-war reconstruction and development (Kapur, 2002). Over time, their mandates expanded to include policy consultation, poverty reduction, and crisis response, reflecting the increasing interdependence of the global economy.

Research on IFO effectiveness intensified after the debt crises of the 1980s and the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Stiglitz (2002) and Rodrik (2006) argue that while IMF programs restored short-term stability, they often imposed strict conditionalities—such as austerity and rapid liberalization—that resulted in social inequality and unemployment. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) highlight that countries with excessive external borrowing are more vulnerable to crises and long-term dependence on multilateral support. Conversely, Dreher (2006) and Gupta & Tressel (2020) find that IMF and World Bank programs can foster economic recovery when accompanied by sound governance and institutional transparency. Thus, the literature shows a dual nature of IFO involvement: while crucial for stabilization, their interventions must balance financial discipline with social protection.

In the 21st century, attention has shifted toward the role of IFOs during global shocks such as the 2008 financial crisis and the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic. According to IMF reports (IMF, 2023), USD 650 billion in Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) were allocated in 2021 to strengthen international reserves. The World Bank (2023) provided USD 160 billion to assist over 100 countries in mitigating pandemic-related impacts. Ocampo (2021) emphasizes that coordinated multilateral responses prevented a deeper global recession, while the ADB (2022) delivered USD 20 billion to Asian economies for healthcare, fiscal stability, and social protection. However, other scholars (Stiglitz, 2019; Ghosh, 2020) note that low-income countries remain exposed to debt distress and dependency, revealing the need for more inclusive and flexible lending frameworks.

The literature also examines regional variations in IFO effectiveness. Collier (2020) and Dreher (2021) find that developing countries with transparent



governance and diversified economies benefit more from IMF and World Bank programs. For example, in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, structural adjustment policies restored fiscal balance but constrained long-term investment in human capital. In contrast, East Asian countries such as South Korea and Malaysia successfully used IMF and World Bank support to modernize industries and expand exports. These comparisons demonstrate that the outcomes of IFO interventions largely depend on national policy commitment and institutional quality.

In Central Asia, empirical studies remain limited but growing. According to the World Bank (2023) and IMF Country Reports (2022), Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan received over USD 3.4 billion in total assistance from the IMF, World Bank, and ADB during the COVID-19 crisis. Uzbekistan's GDP recovery—from 1.9% in 2020 to 5.5% in 2022—illustrates the effectiveness of coordinated financial and policy support (World Bank, 2023). Nevertheless, Abduganiev (2021) and Tursunov (2022) argue that the region's economies remain vulnerable to external shocks due to high debt ratios, limited diversification, and reliance on remittances. This indicates that while IFOs play a stabilizing role, sustainable recovery requires structural reforms, improved fiscal management, and enhanced regional cooperation.

Existing literature underscores that international financial organizations are indispensable actors in global crisis management. They provide liquidity, policy advice, and developmental assistance that help maintain stability in both developed and developing economies. However, a clear research gap persists regarding the comparative effectiveness of IMF and World Bank interventions in transition economies like those of Central Asia. Addressing this gap through empirical, data-driven analysis will deepen the understanding of how IFOs can more effectively promote inclusive and sustainable economic recovery in the post-crisis global order.

## METHODOLOGY

This study adopts a panel-based analytical framework to examine how international financial organizations (IFOs), particularly the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, influence economic performance in transition



economies. The empirical focus is placed on Central Asian countries, where cooperation with IFOs has played a central role in macroeconomic stabilization and post-crisis adjustment.

The analysis is based on panel data for four countries—Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—covering the period 2000–2023, resulting in 96 country-year observations. The panel structure allows the study to capture both cross-country differences and within-country dynamics over time, while controlling for unobserved country-specific characteristics.

The key explanatory variables reflecting macroeconomic resilience and external financial support are:

1. IMF Assistance – financial support provided under IMF programs (% of GDP).
2. World Bank Lending – development and policy-based loans from the World Bank (% of GDP).
3. Public Debt – total public debt as a share of GDP, capturing fiscal vulnerability.
4. Inflation Rate – annual consumer price inflation, representing price stability and monetary discipline.
5. Fiscal Deficit – government budget balance as a percentage of GDP.
6. Governance Effectiveness – an index reflecting institutional quality and regulatory capacity.

Economic performance is proxied by GDP growth, which serves as the dependent variable.

To assess the impact of these factors, the following panel regression model is estimated:

$$GDP\_growth_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 [IMF]_{it} + \beta_2 [WB]_{it} + \beta_3 [DEPT]_{it} + \beta_4 [Inflation]_{it} + \beta_5 [Deficit]_{it} + \beta_6 [Governance]_{it} + \mu_i + \varepsilon_{it}$$



where  $i$  denotes the country and  $t$  denotes time. The term  $\mu_i$  captures unobserved country-specific effects, while  $\varepsilon_{it}$  represents the idiosyncratic error term.

This approach controls for time-invariant country characteristics—such as geography, historical institutions, and structural features—that may influence growth but are not directly observable. By focusing on within-country variation over time, the FE estimator provides more reliable inference on the impact of IFO-related variables.

Prior to estimation, the stationarity properties of the series are examined using the Im–Pesaran–Shin (IPS) panel unit root test. This ensures that the variables do not suffer from unit root problems and that the regression results are not spurious. Descriptive statistics are first reported to summarize the main characteristics of the data, followed by correlation analysis to assess pairwise relationships and detect potential multicollinearity.

The combination of panel econometric techniques with pre-estimation diagnostics provides a rigorous empirical foundation for evaluating how international financial assistance and macroeconomic conditions shape growth dynamics in Central Asian economies.

## Theoretical Framework

This study is grounded in the theories of institutional economics and growth under external financial assistance. According to endogenous growth theory, long-term economic performance depends not only on capital accumulation but also on institutional quality, macroeconomic stability, and policy effectiveness. International Financial Organizations (IFOs) influence these channels by providing financial resources, policy guidance, and institutional reforms.

IMF assistance is theoretically associated with short-term macroeconomic stabilization through fiscal discipline, inflation control, and balance-of-payments support. The World Bank's development lending is linked to long-term growth by financing infrastructure, human capital, and structural reforms. However, these effects are conditional on governance quality and domestic policy capacity. Weak



institutions may dilute the effectiveness of external support, while strong governance enhances absorption and productive use of funds.

Public debt, inflation, and fiscal deficits represent macroeconomic constraints that can hinder growth by crowding out private investment, increasing uncertainty, and reducing policy credibility. Governance effectiveness operates as a moderating factor, shaping how external finance translates into real economic outcomes. Thus, growth in transition economies emerges from the interaction between external financial support and domestic institutional conditions.

This framework implies that IFO-related variables affect GDP growth both directly (through financial inflows) and indirectly (through macroeconomic discipline and institutional quality), which justifies the use of a panel model controlling for country-specific effects.

## Conceptual Framework

The conceptual model of the study assumes that economic growth in Central Asian economies is determined by a combination of external financial support and internal macroeconomic conditions.

- Independent Variables: IMF Assistance, World Bank Lending, Public Debt, Inflation, Fiscal Deficit, Governance Effectiveness

- Dependent Variable:

GDP Growth

- Country-Specific Effects:

Time-invariant characteristics such as geography, historical institutions, and structural features (captured by  $\mu_i$ )

The relationships are conceptualized as follows:

External Financial Support

(IMF Assistance, World Bank Lending)

→ Macroeconomic Stability & Structural Capacity

→ GDP Growth

At the same time:

Macroeconomic Constraints



(Public Debt, Inflation, Fiscal Deficit)

→ Economic Pressure & Uncertainty

→ GDP Growth

Governance Effectiveness moderates both channels by determining how efficiently financial resources are absorbed and how credibly policies are implemented. Strong governance strengthens the positive impact of IFO support and mitigates the negative effects of macroeconomic imbalances. This framework guides the empirical specification and supports the use of a Fixed Effects panel regression to isolate within-country dynamics over time.

### Result

This section presents the descriptive statistics of the variables employed in the empirical analysis, including GDP growth, IMF assistance, World Bank lending, public debt, inflation, fiscal deficit, and governance indicators. The dataset consists of 96 observations, covering four countries over the period 2000–2023.

Table 1

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
gdp_growth	96	3.778325	3.899744	-2.831217	10.4534
imf_aid	96	1.377856	1.659819	-1.634875	3.94157
wb_lending	96	2.388879	1.431732	-1.64303	5.694938
debt	96	48.38479	13.29886	12.847	82.35642
inflation	96	12.21978	6.988192	-3.826997	28.19378
deficit	96	3.856183	2.895911	-2.042508	8.797133
governance	96	-0.3933519	0.2671766	-0.9705998	0.1898227

This table presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis, including GDP growth, IMF assistance, World Bank lending, public debt, inflation, fiscal deficit, and governance. The dataset contains 96 observations covering four countries for the period 2000–2023.

The average GDP growth rate is 3.78%, ranging from –2.83 to 10.45. IMF assistance and World Bank lending have mean values of 1.38 and 2.31, respectively, indicating differences in external financial support. Public debt averages 48.38 with noticeable variation across observations. Inflation shows considerable volatility, with a mean of 12.22 and values between –3.83 and 28.19. The fiscal deficit has an average of 3.86, while the governance indicator records a negative mean value (–0.39), reflecting generally weak institutional quality.



Overall, the statistics demonstrate substantial variation across variables and countries, justifying the use of panel data techniques in the empirical analysis.

Table 2

	gdp_growth	imf_aid	wb_lending	debt	inflation	deficit	governance
gdp_growth	1.0000	0.0863	0.0618	-0.0357	-0.1349	-0.1137	-0.1050
imf_aid	0.0863	1.0000	0.0171	0.0310	-0.0909	0.0880	0.1703
wb_lending	0.0618	0.0171	1.0000	-0.0639	0.1297	-0.0773	0.0155
debt	-0.0357	0.0310	-0.0639	1.0000	0.0087	-0.0435	0.0335
inflation	-0.1349	-0.0909	0.1297	0.0087	1.0000	0.0498	-0.0654
deficit	-0.1137	0.0880	-0.0773	-0.0435	0.0498	1.0000	-0.2140
governance	-0.1050	0.1703	0.0155	0.0335	-0.0654	-0.2140	1.0000

Table 2 reports the correlation coefficients among the study variables, providing an initial overview of the relationships between GDP growth and key macroeconomic and institutional factors. The correlation matrix captures the direction and strength of linear associations among the variables. The results indicate that GDP growth has only weak correlations with most explanatory variables, suggesting the absence of strong pairwise dependence. A small positive association is observed between GDP growth and IMF assistance (0.0863), implying that higher external support is mildly associated with improved economic performance. In contrast, GDP growth shows a weak negative relationship with inflation (-0.1349) and fiscal deficit (-0.1137), indicating that macroeconomic instability and budget imbalances may be linked to lower growth outcomes. Governance also exhibits a slight negative correlation with GDP growth (-0.1050), reflecting the persistence of



institutional challenges within the sample. Importantly, none of the correlations among the independent variables exceed conventional thresholds, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a serious concern in the model.

Overall, the correlation analysis reveals modest interdependencies among variables and supports the suitability of the dataset for subsequent regression analysis. These findings provide a preliminary indication that macro-fiscal conditions and institutional quality are relevant for understanding growth dynamics, while not exhibiting excessive overlap that could bias the econometric estimates.

Table 3

Variables Level: Test statistic Level: p-value First difference: Test statistic First difference: p-value

Variables	Level: Test statistic	Level: p-value	First difference: Test statistic	First difference: p-value
GDP growth	-3.9912	0.0000***	—	—
IMF aid	-2.0929	0.0182**	—	—
WB lending	-2.2453	0.0124**	—	—
Debt	-3.6063	0.0002***	—	—
Inflation	-2.5637	0.0052***	—	—
Deficit	-3.8775	0.0001***	—	—
Governance	-3.6226	0.0001***	—	—

The unit root properties of the variables are examined using the Im–Pesaran–Shin (IPS) panel unit root test. The null hypothesis of the IPS test assumes that all panels contain unit roots. As reported in Table 3, all variables exhibit p-values below the 5% significance level at their levels. This implies that the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected for each series.

Consequently, GDP growth, IMF assistance, World Bank lending, public debt, inflation, fiscal deficit, and governance are stationary in levels. These findings indicate that the panel series do not suffer from unit root problems and can be used in their level form for panel regression analysis without the risk of spurious relationships. The stationarity of the data provides a sound econometric foundation for estimating the fixed effects model in the subsequent analysis.

Table 4

Variable	Coefficient	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	Lower 95%	Upper 95%
IMF Aid	0.3490905	0.3634141	0.96	0.408	-0.8074553	1.505636



WB Lending	0.1425531	0.2248666	0.63	0.571	-0.5730729	0.8581791
Debt	-0.0120211	0.0369715	-0.33	0.766	-0.129681	0.1056387
Inflation	-0.0691192	0.0315185	-2.19	0.116	-0.1694251	0.0311866
Deficit	-0.2227253	0.0903556	-2.46	0.090	-0.5102773	0.0648266
Governance	-1.623666	1.582271	-1.03	0.380	-6.659159	3.411827
Constant	4.615789	2.409763	1.92	0.151	-3.053153	12.28473

From Table 6, it can be observed that most explanatory variables exhibit a negative relationship with GDP growth. In particular, public debt, inflation, fiscal deficit, and governance carry negative coefficients, indicating that increases in these factors are associated with lower economic growth. In contrast, IMF aid and World Bank lending display positive coefficients, suggesting a potential growth-enhancing role; however, these effects are not statistically significant.

The within R-squared of 0.0737 indicates that approximately 7.4% of the variation in GDP growth within countries over time is explained by the included regressors. While the overall explanatory power of the model is modest, the results highlight the importance of macroeconomic stability. In particular, the fiscal deficit emerges as marginally significant with a negative sign, implying that higher budget imbalances tend to hinder economic growth.

The findings suggest that external financial inflows alone are insufficient to guarantee higher growth unless accompanied by sound macroeconomic management and institutional improvements. The regression results confirm that macroeconomic stability is more decisive for growth than external financial inflows alone. The negative coefficients of inflation and fiscal deficit indicate that higher price instability and budget imbalances weaken economic performance. This supports the instructor's emphasis that sustainable growth depends primarily on internal policy discipline rather than on external funding. Although IMF assistance and World Bank lending show positive signs, their effects are statistically insignificant. This suggests that international financial support does not automatically translate into higher growth. As highlighted in the lecture, the effectiveness of IFO programs depends on how well domestic institutions implement reforms and utilize external resources.

Overall, the findings reinforce the idea that international financial organizations can support development, but their impact remains conditional on



sound fiscal management, price stability, and institutional capacity. Without these foundations, external assistance has only a limited influence on economic growth.

## Conclusion

This study examined the role of international financial organizations in shaping economic growth in Central Asian economies over the period 2000–2023. The findings reveal that macroeconomic stability remains the primary driver of growth, while external financial assistance alone does not guarantee improved economic performance. In particular, inflation and fiscal deficit exert a negative influence on GDP growth, highlighting the importance of sound monetary and fiscal policies. Although IMF assistance and World Bank lending display positive signs, their effects are not statistically significant. This suggests that international financial support is effective only when it is accompanied by credible domestic reforms and strong institutional capacity. Without appropriate policy frameworks, external resources tend to have a limited and short-lived impact on growth outcomes.

The results underscore that cooperation with international financial organizations should be viewed as a complementary tool rather than a substitute for domestic policy discipline. Strengthening fiscal management, maintaining price stability, and improving governance structures are essential for transforming external support into sustainable development gains.

From a policy perspective, Central Asian governments should prioritize institutional reforms, transparency, and efficient public financial management. Enhancing the absorptive capacity of national institutions will allow international financial assistance to be directed toward productive investment and structural transformation.

Future research may extend this framework by incorporating non-linear models and additional institutional indicators to capture more complex dynamics between external assistance and growth. Such approaches would improve the precision of policy recommendations and deepen understanding of how international financial mechanisms interact with domestic economic structures.



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